. I have recently noted that the proof of one of theorems in it was incorrect; it was also independently discovered by Guillaume Massas (UC Irvine). This does not concern the main result claimed in the title (Theorem 11), which seems unassailable, but rather my attempt to present the proof of Theorem 5, essentially due to Shehtman, without, as I say below, "a superfluous use of transfinite induction" (i.e., 
In the 1970's, a number of important, deep and technically complicated results concerning relational semantics for modal logics was obtained by such authors as S. Thomason, K. Fine, M.S. Gerson, R.I. Goldblatt, J. F. A. K. van Benthem and W. Blok; it was the Golden Age of the subject, see [Bu82] , [Bu83] and [ChZ97] for references and summaries of the most important works. The main goal of my paper is to draw attention to the fact that many important results lack superintuitionistic analogues, although the task of transferring them is highly nontrivial.
This gap may be partially due to the fact that Kripke semantics never became as popular in the realm of intermediate logics as they are in the realm of modal logics, which are more suitable and flexible tools to deal with frames. There were fewer experts working on relational semantics for intuitionistic logics. In 1977, one of the most distinguished persons in the field, V. B. Shehtman, constructed the first Kripke incomplete intermediate propositional logic. His construction was based mainly on a frame from [Fi74b] , but he very ingeniously used a formula introduced in [GdJ74] . Nevertheless, he did not follow Fine's suggestion that it seems to be possible to construct a continuum of incomplete logics. Such a continuum of S4 logics was presented in [Ry77] in the same year as Shehtman's construction; it is known, however, that the incompleteness of a modal logic does not imply the incompleteness of its intuitionistic equivalent. In [On72] one may find the claim that there exists a continuum of incomplete predicate superintuitionistic logics. Unfortunately, this claim is given without proof; besides, it is far easier to construct an incomplete predicate superintuitionistic logic than to construct an incomplete propositional superintuitionistic logic. It is truly surprising but up to this day no-one has presented a proof that there exists a continuum of such logics. I shall attempt to fill in this gap.
In this paper I shall try to conform to the standard definitions and symbols which may be found, for example, in a monograph by Chagrov & Zakharyaschev [ChZ97]. Nevertheless, for the sake of convenience, let me remind the most standard ones. Unless otherwise stated, by a logic I shall mean a superintuitionistic (intermediate) logic.
Definition 1 A (Kripke) structure/frame consists of a set and a relation of partial order F = W, .
Definition 2 A substructure/subframe of a structure F = W, is a frame G = V, 1 where V ⊆ W and 1 = V 2 ∩ .
Definition 3 A (Kripke) model is an ordered pair M = F , B consisting of a frame F = W, and a function B from the set of propositional variables to the set of upward closed subsets of W . Valuation is extended to all formulas in the usual way.
I would like now to introduce two technical notions, weaker than finite approximability (finite model property) and stronger than completeness Definition 4 A logic is fa-approximable iff the set of its theorems coincides with the set of all formulas which are true in some class of rooted frames with no infinite antichains.
Definition 5 A logic is ac-approximable iff the set of its theorems coincides with the set of all formulas true in some class of frames with no infinite ascending chains -Chagrov & Zakharayaschev call such orders Noetherian.
Professor A. Wroński has suggested that fa-approximability implies acapproximability. This would give rise to the following picture:
finite approximability ⇒ fa-approximability ⇒ acapproximability ⇒ completeness.
In my paper, I shall prove that there exists a continuum of propositional logics even outside the broadest class, i.e. the class of all complete logics. Nevertheless, first let me describe how an incomplete logic can be obtained -it is an easy generalization of Shehtman's method [Sh77] .
Theorem 1 A logic L lacks ac-approximability iff its modal companion above Grz τL is incomplete.
Proof. It is enough to recall that Grz is complete with respect to all partial orders without infinite ascending chains. ⊣ Theorem 2 If there exists a rule of the form
(e is any uniform substitution) which is not admissible in some intermediate logic, then this logic lacks ac-approximability and thus lacks the finite model property.
In any family of frames adequate for the logic (if there exists such) there must be a frame validating
with all substitutions (because the formula belongs to the logic) and refuting χ under some valuation. It can be easily seen that such a frame must contain an infinite ascending chain -see figure 1. ⊣
Corollary 3
If an intermediate logic satisfies the assumptions of theorem 2, then its companion above Grz is incomplete.
Proof. A consequence of theorems 1 and 2. ⊣
In fact far more can be proved about such a logic -see my forthcoming paper [Li02] .
Theorem 4 If there exists a rule of the form
which is not admissible in a logic L, then in any class of frames adequate for L (if there exists any) there must be a structure containing an infinite comb or a willow (see fig. 2 ) as a substructure; thus, L must lack both acapproximability and fa-approximability. 
which are complete with respect to the class of all finite frames of branching n. It is well known that they can be refuted in the infinite comb. Nevertheless, not every frame containing the infinite comb as a substructure refutes these axioms -see figure 3 . Therefore the following theorem is nontrivial:
Theorem 5 If there exists a rule of the form
which is not admissible in some intermediate logic L, then in any class of frames adequate for L (if there exists any) there must exist a structure refuting bb n (n ≥ 2). Thus, if L contains any of Gabbay-de Jongh axioms, it must be incomplete.
Proof. It may be carried out in a manner similar to that of Shehtman [Sh77] , but it is needlessly complicated, e.g. with a superfluous use of transfinite induction. Therefore I would like to sketch a more elegant and intuitive proof. Assume then that there is a frame F for L, a valuation V and a point x in F such that x V χ. It is easy to check that x must be V(e n (ψ)).
Axioms of L and Figure 4 ensure that sets B(p 0 ), B(p 1 ) and B(p 2 ) are distinct and non-empty. It is easily seen that the consequent of bb 2 is refuted at x under the valuation B. Now suppose that there is some y x such that some conjunct of the premise of bb 2 is classically refuted at y, e.g.,
and
(2) and (3) taken together imply
We claim that ∃n ∈ ω y V e n (χ).
To see this, assume (5) does not hold, that is, e n (ψ) ∨ e n+1 (τ ) is V-satisfied at y for every n. Pick the smallest m s.t. y V e m (ψ); it exists by (3). This means e m+1 (τ ) must be satisfied, thus yielding y V e m ′ (ψ) for every m ′ > m. As by the assumption on m we have the same for every m ′ < m as well, we thus contradict (4). Hence, we can pick the smallest m s.t. the one in Figure 4 , but whose root this time is y and whose labelling is obtained by replacing each formula in Figure 4 by its suitably iterated esubstitution; think of the subframe generated by the m-th point up the trunk. It is consequently possible to find some (in fact, infinitely many) points from this comb classically refuting p 0 → (p 1 ∨ p 2 ), contradicting (2). ⊣
TML2018:
The rest of the paper is left in the form it was written in 2002.
It may be worth mentioning that rule 1 is as a matter of fact inspired by the form of axioms in Shehtman's later paper [Sh80] . In his paper from 1977 [Sh77] the axioms were more complicated and to make Shehtman's 1977 theorem a consequence of theorem 5 -as I am going to do -rule 1 should be replaced by the following one:
Now let me consider a family of formulas introduced by Shehtman:
If ς stands for β 2 ∧ γ 2 , τ stands for β 1 ∨ γ 1 and e is defined as follows:
then the following observation allows me to use a variant of theorem 5 concerning rule 6 α 0 is of the form ψ, i.e.
is an Int-tautology.
Of course, it would also be possible to use theorem 5 without any modification. In this case one should define ǫ as α 0 ∨ β 2 ∨ γ 2 or even α 0 ∨ β 2 , δ as (α 0 → α 1 ∨ β 3 ) → α 0 ∨ β 2 and no κ is needed at all. Nevertheless, I am going to stick to the first paper of Shehtman to make references easier; the paper from 1980 [Sh80] is less known.
Lemma 6 Axioms δ and κ are true in a structure known as the Fine frame (see figure 5 ). Axiom bb n is true in a general frame based on the Fine frame and generated by the two upward closed singletons. The same general frame refutes axiom ǫ.
Proof. It is quite easy and may be found, for example, in [Sh77] . ⊣ Corollary 7 (Shehtman) An intermediate logic L determined by axioms δ, κ, and bb 2 is incomplete.
Proof. A consequence of theorem 5 and lemma 6. ⊣ Now I may construct a continuum of incomplete logics inspired by ideas from Kit Fine's classical papers [Fi74a] , [Fi74b] . I will construct a sequence of frames F n (see fig. 6 ) very similar to the sequence from [Fi74a] .
Proof. The fact that the Gabbay-de Jongh axioms are true in all of those frames is obvious. It is impossible to simultaneously refute α 0 and α 1 in any of the frames, which implies that F n δ ∧ ǫ. The validity of κ may be shown in the same way as in case of the Fine frame. ⊣ r r 
Figure 6: Frames F 0 , F 1 , F 2 , F 3
Lemma 9 For any n ∈ ω, there exists no p-morphism from any generated subframe of F n onto F m (m = n). In other words,
where β # (F m , ⊥) is a Jankov formula for F m .
Proof. It is similar to the one in [Fi74a] (by induction). ⊣ Lemma 10 For any n ∈ ω, there exists no p-morphism from any generated subframe of the Fine frame onto F n . In other words, Jankov formulas for the entire sequence are satisfied in the Fine frame.
Proof. As above. ⊣ Theorem 11 Distinct subsets of natural numbers generate distinct intermediate logics whose axioms are δ, κ, bb 2 and the Jankov formulas of those frames from the sequence whose indices belong to a given subset of ω. All of these logics are incomplete.
Proof. The fact that these logics are all distinct is a consequence of lemmas 8 and 9. The fact that these logics are incomplete follows from theorems 5 and lemmas 6 and 10 -a suitable inference rule is not admissible in any of the logics. ⊣ I would like to thank Professor A. Wroński, the supervisor of my master's thesis, for his constant help and advice.
